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ABSTRACT
Neoclassical growth models predict that reductions in capital or labor tax rates are expansionary
when lump-sum transfers are used to balance the government budget. This paper explores the 
consequences of bond-financed tax reductions that bring forth a range of possible offsetting 
policies, including future government consumption, capital tax rates, or labor tax rates. Through 
the resulting intertemporal distortions, current tax cuts can be contractionary. The paper also 
finds that more aggressive responses of offsetting policies to debt engender less debt 
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1. Introduction
In a recent paper, Mankiw and Weinzierl (forthcoming) brought modern quantita-
tive macroeconomic analysis to bear on an important and timely policy issue: can
permanent tax rate cuts stimulate economic growth and raise the tax base enough
to oﬀset some of the revenue loss? They address this issue of dynamic scoring in a
conventional neoclassical growth model. A calibrated version of the model suggests
that permanent reduction in capital (labor) tax rates can stimulate growth enough
to oﬀset 53 percent (17 percent) of the revenue loss. In their exercises, Mankiw and
Weinzierl also ﬁnd that static scoring always overstates the revenue loss of tax cuts.
In this paper, as in Mankiw and Weinzierl, dynamic scoring evaluates revenue
eﬀects of a tax proposal using dynamic macroeconomic models. This is distinguished
from static scoring, which is deﬁned as the revenue consequences of tax changes when
there is no feedback from output or any other behavioral response to taxes. Although
static scoring is sometimes equated to the methods employed by government agencies,
such as the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), estimates by the JCT
incorporate feedback eﬀects from microdynamic behavior [see Joint Committee on
Taxation (2005) and Auerbach (2005) for details].
1
Mankiw and Weinzierl’s provocative results hinge on the maintained assumption
that lump-sum transfers are permanently cut to balance the government’s budget
in the face of any revenues losses. Given the vagaries of the political system, this
Ricardian equivalent outcome is at best a benchmark scenario. To the extent that a
reduction in one ﬁscal distortion is replaced by a change in some other distortion, or
Date: March 7, 2006. Indiana University and NBER, eleeper@indiana.edu; Joint Committee on
Taxation, U.S. Congress, susan.yang@mail.house.gov. Jürgen Jung and Chung-Quang Tran provided
research assistance. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation
under Grant No. SES-0452599. The views expressed in this paper are strictly those of the authors
and should not be attributed to the Joint Committee on Taxation or any Member of Congress.
1The dynamic and static scoring exercises in this paper, as in Mankiw and Weinzierl, diﬀer from
the practices at the JCT, Congressional Budget Oﬃce, and Treasury. In practice, conventional
revenue estimation incorporates macroeconomic forecast under existing tax laws and microeconomic
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combination of distortions, Mankiw and Weinzierl’s results are likely to change. This
paper examines the robustness of their dynamic scores by considering alternative ﬁscal
responses to permanent tax-rate cuts. We ﬁnd that the assumption that transfers do
all the adjusting is critical to Mankiw and Weinzierl’s sanguine conclusions. Policy
makers considering persistent changes in tax rates would do well to consider a range
of possible ﬁscal responses to the resulting revenue shortfall.
Two conclusions emerge from this paper. First, a debt-ﬁnanced tax cut does not
always have the positive growth eﬀects obtained in neoclassical models without debt.
The growth eﬀects of a tax cut depend crucially on which ﬁscal policy is adjusted.
Hence, there is no guarantee that static estimates of revenue eﬀects of tax cuts, which
assume no feedback from changing tax bases, necessarily overstate the revenue loss,
as Mankiw and Weinzierl (forthcoming) conclude. Second, how aggressively policy
responds to debt matters for the growth eﬀects of tax policy. Among distorting
policies that ensure sustainability, a stronger response yields a smaller long-run debt-
output ratio and more favorable growth consequences from a tax cut.
2. Background
Neoclassical growth models have become the main framework for studying the
macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal policy, at least since Baxter and King (1993). When
income tax rates are reduced and the government budget is balanced by lump-sum
taxes or transfers, this class of models generates substantial growth, arising from
higher expected returns to labor and investment.
Growth eﬀects of tax cuts are often cited in policy debates to advocate tax cuts.
While it is not uncommon for Congress to cut transfer payments when faced with
revenue shortfalls, the federal government frequently resorts to borrowing instead,
postponing the inevitable adjustments in spending or taxes. The federal debt-GDP
ratio climbed from 57.4 percent in 2001 to 65.7 percent in 2005 [estimate from Eco-
nomic Report of the President (2005)], partially due to the series of tax cuts since
2001. Demographic trends are expected to create persistent increases in Social Secu-
rity, Medicare, and other transfer programs well into the 21st century [Congressional
Budget Oﬃce (2002)], making the maintained assumption that tax cuts are funded
through transfer reductions an increasingly unlikely scenario.
Since the well-publicized assertion of the Laﬀer (1979) curve, research has at-
tempted to ﬁnd its theoretical underpinnings. The supply-side argument that cutting
taxes generates growth is well demonstrated by endogenous growth models, where
the steady state economic growth rate rises when income tax rates are lowered [King
and Rebelo (1990)]. Ireland (1994) further shows that the expansionary eﬀects of aDYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 3
debt-ﬁnanced tax cut can be strong enough to pay oﬀ debt in the long run without
oﬀsetting ﬁscal policy, if the growth rate after a tax cut outpaces the growth rate of
government debt. However, subsequent studies by Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) and
Novales and Ruiz (2002) ﬁnd that tax cuts can improve the long-run budget only for
a relatively high elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption. While doubt
remains about whether a deﬁcit-ﬁnanced tax cut can actually be self-ﬁnancing, this
paper considers circumstances in which such a tax cut induces future ﬁscal policy
adjustments that maintain a sustainable budget.
We use a standard neoclassical growth model with government debt and separate
distorting taxation on capital and labor income. Since the steady state growth rate
of the economy is invariant to ﬁscal policy, debt-ﬁnanced tax cuts necessarily involve
adjustments in future policy to ensure that the government’s intertemporal budget
constraint holds. Expectations of future policies interact with labor and investment
incentives from a current tax cut. Mankiw and Weinzierl (forthcoming) use the same
type of model without debt to show that while capital or labor tax cuts cannot
pay for themselves fully as suggested by the Laﬀer curve, the revenue feedback from
economic growth is substantial. Because tax cuts are ﬁnanced by reductions in lump-
sum transfers, intertemporal interactions with future policies are eliminated from their
model. This paper shows that eliminating those intertemporal margins has important
consequences for the growth eﬀects of tax cuts.2
Speciﬁcally, we consider permanent reductions in capital or labor tax rates. Fiscal
sustainability is ensured by one of three possible policy responses: (1) lower future
government transfer-output ratios, (2) lower future government spending-output ra-
tios, or (3) future increases in other tax rates. We assume the adjustments arise
intertemporally through policy rules that make ﬁscal variables respond to deviations
of debt-GDP from its steady-state value. The simple policy rules adopted in this
paper are an abstraction designed to capture the practice of ﬁscal policy: when the
ﬁscal budget deteriorates, explicit ﬁscal actions typically are taken to improve the
budget situation.
For state governments, oﬀsetting ﬁscal policy is triggered relatively quickly, as most
state constitutions require balancing the budget within a couple of years. No analo-
gous statutory requirement constrains federal behavior, and oﬀsetting policy actions
can take much longer to be implemented. For example, when the debt-output ratio
2Baxter and King (1993) and Ludvigson (1996) also use exogenous growth models to investigate
ﬁscal policy eﬀects where lump-sum taxes or transfers are not allowed to be used to balance the
budget. In these two papers, tax policy is the endogenous oﬀsetting policy, which occurs contempo-
raneously to satisfy the government budget constraint each period.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 4
rose rapidly in the early and mid-1980s (partly due to the large tax cuts in the Eco-
nomic Recovery Act of 1981), the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings balanced-budget law was
e n a c t e di n1 9 8 5t or e d u c ed e ﬁcits. In addition, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Acts of 1990 and 1993, which increased individual and corporate income tax rates,
were passed to reduce government debt. The quickly rising debt-GDP ratio since 2001
again has spurred calls for cutting federal deﬁcits [Greenspan (2005a) and Greenspan
(2005b)].
Aside from anecdotal examples, some econometric evidence ﬁnds that policy makers
systematically take corrective measures in response to rising debt levels. Using long-
term U.S. data from 1916 to 1995, Bohn (1998) concludes that the primary surplus is
an increasing function of the debt-GDP ratio, and the ratio is mean-reverting, after
controlling for war-time spending and for cyclical ﬂuctuations. Davig and Leeper
(2005) estimate a regime switching rule for tax policy over the post-war period in the
U.S. and ﬁnd that policy swings between periods when taxes pursue a countercyclical
objective and periods when they respond aggressively to debt. Davig (2005) uses a
Markov-switching model to test the global sustainability of U.S. post-war budget; he
ﬁnds that threats to long-run sustainability posed by expanding periods of discounted
debt are mitigated by the expectation of returning to a regime where debt is repaid.
This evidence underscores the empirical relevance of considering alternative ﬁscal
adjustments to tax reductions.3
3. The Model
The model economy consists of a government and a large number of inﬁnitely-lived,
identical households and ﬁrms.
3.1. The private sector. Each period a representative household chooses consump-
tion, Ct, capital, Kt,h o u r sw o r k e d ,Lt, and one-period government bonds, Bt, to
















3Empirical work in the style of Bohn’s suﬀers from a potential identiﬁcation problem. Intertem-
poral government budget balance ensures that in any equilibrium there is a positive relationship
between the value of debt and future net-of-interest surpluses. It is diﬃcult to distinguish whether
regressions of surpluses against debt represent the rule governing the ﬁscal authority’s behavior
or merely reﬂect a correlation that is a necessary implication of equilibrium. Markov switching
estimates can be immune to this identiﬁcation problem.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 5
subject to the budget constraint












WtLt +( 1− δ)Kt−1 + Bt−1Rt−1 + Tt.
Et is the expectation operator conditional on the household’s information set at t,
which contains all variables dated t and earlier. β i st h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r( 0 <β<1).
γ and θ are the inverses of elasticities of intertemporal substitution of consumption
and leisure (γ>0 and θ ≥ 0). τK
t and τL
t are proportional tax rates levied on capital
and labor income. Tt is lump-sum transfers if positive (taxes if negative). δ is the
capital depreciation rate (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1). Wt is real wage and rt is the capital rental rate.







¢1−α − WtLt − rtKt−1,
where A is total factor productivity (A>0), h is the constant growth rate of labor
augmenting technology (h ≥ 1 ), and α is the share of capital in output (0 <α<1).
T h et o t a lg o o d sp r o d u c e de a c hp e r i o di sYt = AKα
t−1 (htLt)
1−α .
3.2. The government. To study the implications of alternative ﬁnancing schemes
for tax rate reductions, we posit simple rules for policy instruments that make choices
of policy variables respond to the state of government indebtedness, as indicated by































































Yt . Variables without time subscripts are deterministic
steady-state values. To allow for possibly permanent surprise changes in tax rates,















where |ρK|,|ρL| ≤ 1,a n dεK
t and εL
t are i.i.d. shocks. Permanent tax changes set
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We refer to the q’s in rules (1)-(4) as the “ﬁscal adjustment parameters.” Sign
restrictions on qK,q L, and qG, summarized in table 1, are straightforward. When the
debt-output ratio is above steady state, one of the future distorting tax rates is raised
or the government consumption-output ratio is lowered to maintain ﬁscal solvency.
As for qT, because the model is calibrated to include transfers (instead of lump-sum
taxes) in steady state, future transfers as a share of output must be lowered when the
debt-output ratio rises. To isolate the impacts of alternative ﬁnancing schemes, only
one of the four ﬁscal rules is operative in each experiment. That is, in each policy
experiment, only one of the four ﬁscal adjustment parameters is non-zero, as shown
in table 1.
Policy choices must satisfy rules (1)-(4) and the government’s budget constraint at
each date:
Bt = Gt + Rt−1Bt−1 − τ
L
t WtLt − τ
K
t rtKt−1 + Tt. (7)
3.3. The solution method. Following King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988), the model,
which has a deterministic growth trend h, is scaled by the factor of ht. This creates a
new discount factor, β
∗ ≡ βh1−γ, such that the steady state of the economy has con-
stant output growth and consumption, and investment are constant shares of output.
An analytical solution is not available; the equilibrium conditions are log-linearized
around the original steady state and analyzed in terms of percentage deviations from
the economy’s steady state growth path. The model is solved using Sims’s (2001)
algorithm.
We examine permanent tax cuts. The use of log-linearization may raise concerns
about the quality of the ﬁrst-order approximation when the equilibrium is away from
the original steady state. Such concerns are alleviated by the facts that the equilib-
rium system for the model is nearly log-linear and that the size of tax cuts considered
here is fairly small (a reduction of 1 percent of tax rates from their original steady
state levels). To check the quality of the approximation, we compare consumption,
investment, labor, and output in the new steady state (the steady state to which the
economy evolves after a permanent 1 percent cut in tax rates) solved by two methods:
one uses approximated log-linear equilibrium system and the other uses the non-linear
equilibrium equations. The second method, solved numerically, yields accurate results
for the new steady state. The comparison shows that the approximation errors for
the four variables using the log-linearized system are all within 0.035 percent of their
new steady state values.
3.4. The equilibrium. The unique competitive equilibrium consists of agents’ deci-
sions {Ct,L t,K t,B t}
∞
t=0,t h eﬁrms’ decisions {Lt,K t}
∞
t=0,p r i c e s{rt,W t}
∞
t=0, and policyDYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 7
variables {Bt,G t,τL
t ,τK
t ,T t} such that, given initial levels of capital and debt, K−1
and B−1, in each period the optimality conditions for agents’ and ﬁrms’ problems are
satisﬁed; the goods, capital, labor, and bond markets clear; the transversality con-
ditions for capital and debt hold; the government budget constraint and the policy
rules (equations (1)-(4)) are satisﬁed.
Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium depend crucially on the size of the ﬁscal
adjustment parameters. Only certain ranges of these coeﬃcients ensure that expected
government debt does not grow faster than the economy, so the transversality con-
dition for debt, Et limT→∞ β
t+T−1u0(ct+T)
Bt+T
ht+T+1 =0 ,i ss a t i s ﬁed. In general, when a
future ﬁscal variable is under- or over-adjusted (the absolute value of the correspond-
ing non-zero q is either too small or too large), an equilibrium fails to exist. It is easy
to see why under-adjustment does not produce an equilibrium: government expenses
are not reduced or receipts do not grow suﬃciently to rein in the speed of debt growth
relative to output. When future policy is over-adjusted, the reasons an equilibrium
fails to exist vary, depending on which ﬁscal variable responds to the debt. If the
government spending share or one of the two tax rates responds, then lowering the
spending share or raising a tax rate too much could slow down output more than the
reduction in debt, and the debt-output ratio still rises and fails to converge to a con-
stant level. If the transfer share responds, reducing this share too much can produce
negative government debt (government lends to the private sector). Policy rule (3)




is undeﬁned when sB
t /sB < 0. The analysis here
focuses on the ranges of the non-zero q’s that yield a unique equilibrium.4
3.5. Model calibration. The model is calibrated at an annual frequency. Table 2
reports the benchmark values of parameters and some steady state variables before
a permanent tax rate change. The choice of the structural parameters is comparable
to those in similar models with distorting capital and labor income taxation [Braun
(1994), McGrattan (1994), Jones (2002), and Yang (2005)]. The model implies that in
the original steady state, the fraction of time spent working is 0.20, the consumption-
output ratio is 0.63, the investment-output ratio is 0.17, and the debt-output ratio is
about 0.4. Each q value represents how aggressively the speciﬁed policy responds to
government debt. For example, if the transfer share is adjusted, under the benchmark
parameter setting, qT = −0.4 and qG = qK = qL =0 . The benchmark settings of
q’s are chosen so that the adjustment of future ﬁscal variables is as gradual as it can
be to maintain a sustainable budget, while ensuring the economy evolves to a new
steady state after about 100 years.5
4Our rationale for restricting attention to equilibria with non-negative government debt is that
in practice governments are rarely net lenders to the private sector.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 8
4. Dynamic Impacts of Permanent Tax Rate Cuts
This section reports the dynamic impacts of permanent reductions in capital and
labor tax rates and shows how those impacts change when the ﬁnancing schemes vary
among permanently higher lump-sum taxes, a lower government consumption-output
ratio, and increases in other proportional tax rates.
4.1. Tax-rate cuts ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes. To show that the government
ﬁnancing rule is an important determinant of the growth eﬀects of permanent tax
cuts, ﬁrst we examine the consequences of tax rate cuts ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes.
The policy rule for the transfer-output share, (3), is operative, with qT = −0.4, so
debt-ﬁnanced deﬁcits reduce expected future transfers (raise lump-sum taxes). Figure
1 reports the responses to a permanent 1 percent cut in the capital or labor tax rate,
ﬁnanced by sales of government debt under the parameter values in table 2.6 The
solid lines are the responses to a capital tax rate cut, and the dashed-dotted lines are
those for a labor tax rate cut.
Both cuts in capital and labor taxes generate growth, with higher investment and
hours worked along the transition path. In the short run, substitution eﬀects created
by lower capital and labor tax rates entice agents to invest more and work harder,
raising output. As the economy converges to the new steady state, wealth eﬀects
from higher disposable income raise consumption and leisure; investment and hours
worked subside somewhat, but remain above their original steady state levels. While
the model used here is discrete and stochastic and the one in Mankiw and Weinzierl
(forthcoming) is continuous and deterministic, the qualitative patterns for permanent
capital or labor tax cuts are the same across the two models. Revenues from capital
and labor income taxes are permanently lower (bottom right panel) and the shortfall
is absorbed by permanently higher lump-sum taxes (bottom left panel).
When the government has access to a non-distorting tax instrument, lower tax
rates appear to be powerful stimulants to growth. We now consider the growth eﬀects
when policy must adjust government consumption or distorting taxes to ensure ﬁscal
sustainability.
4.2. Alternative ﬁnancing schemes. We consider the consequences of permanent
reductions in capital (or labor) tax rates, which are ﬁnanced initially by government
5Section 5 considers the implications of varying the settings of the q’s.
6Although Mankiw and Weinzierl (forthcoming) ﬁnance these tax-rate reductions with contempo-
raneous lump-sum taxes, rather than debt, Ricardian equivalence ensures the two exercises produces
identical results in this model.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 9
debt and eventually by permanent reductions in government consumption or perma-
nent increases in labor (or capital) tax rates. Figure 2 plots the dynamic responses
of macroeconomic variables to a permanent, unexpected 1 percent cut in the cap-
ital tax rate at time 0. Dashed-dotted lines are the impacts with qG = −0.2 and
qT = qK = qL =0 ;solid lines are the impacts with qL =0 .2 and qG = qT = qK =0 ;
for reference, we repeat the responses from ﬁgure 1, which are dashed lines obtained
when qT = −0.4 and qG = qK = qL =0 .7
When the capital tax rate is permanently cut, it increases the expected rate of
return to investment. Regardless of which policy rule is used, agents sacriﬁce con-
sumption in order to invest more in the ﬁrst few years; consumption initially falls
below the level in the original steady state path. Lower consumption raises the mar-
ginal utility of consumption, raising the marginal beneﬁt of working and the supply of
labor. Higher labor and higher capital stock produce more output. After a few years,
the wealth eﬀects of higher income raise consumption and keep investment above its
original steady state path.
On the government ﬁnancing side, the capital tax rate cut drives up the government
debt-output ratio. When lump-sum taxes rise with debt, the tax reduction has its
largest positive eﬀects on investment, hours, and output (dashed lines). This outcome
is not surprising, as a distorting source of tax revenues is replaced by a non-distorting
source.
Alternative ﬁnancing schemes, however, involve changing some other distortion,
with important implications for the impacts of tax changes. Reductions in the gov-
ernment consumption-output ratio (dotted-dashed lines) raise wealth as the govern-
ment absorbs a smaller share of output. Wealthier households consume more leisure,
reducing hours worked both along the transition path and in the new steady state.
In the long run, the reduction in the government consumption ratio crowds in private
consumption, raising consumption above its original steady state level. Ultimately, a
higher after-tax return on investment raises the steady state capital stock and output,
though by less than when lump-sum taxes adjust to clear the government budget.
When the labor income tax rate rises to compensate for the lower capital tax rate,
the permanently lower after-tax return to labor reduces hours worked in the new
steady state. After rising initially, output declines back to its original steady state
level. Permanently higher investment, coupled with a ﬁxed government consumption-
output ratio, implies that consumption is lower in the new steady state.
7We do not allow a tax rate to adjust in response to its own shock. This simply allows the tax
rate being shocked to be permanently held at 1 percent below its original steady state level.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 10
The bottom right panel of the ﬁgure shows that total revenues derived from cap-
ital and labor income taxes are permanently lower when government consumption
or lump-sum taxes adjust, while revenues rise when labor tax rates adjust. The
permanently higher revenues following a capital tax cut arise from higher future la-
bor tax rates. It would be misleading to infer that capital tax cuts per se generate
permanently higher revenues.
Analogous, but diﬀerent, patterns of results emerge when a permanent labor tax
rate reduction is ﬁnanced by three alternative schemes. Figure 3 reports responses
to a 1 percent labor tax rate cut. Dashed-dotted lines and dashed lines report eﬀects
when government consumption and lump-sum taxes adjust using the same parameter
settings that underlie ﬁgure 2. Solid lines give the responses when capital taxes adjust
with qK =0 .3 and qT = qG = qL =0 .
Once again, the tax impacts on investment, hours worked, and output are largest
when lump-sum taxes respond to debt to satisfy the government budget constraint.
Permanently lower labor tax rates raise the return to labor and increase equilibrium
hours and output for the ﬁrst few years. The deﬁcit-ﬁnanced tax cut raises debt as a
share of output.
When future government consumption is reduced in response to the rising debt, the
positive wealth eﬀect oﬀsets the substitution eﬀect induced by a higher after-tax real
wage, and within 15 years of the tax cut, hours worked fall as the economy converges
to a new steady state with lower employment, output, and investment. This negative
long-run growth outcome is strikingly diﬀerent from the case when lump-sum transfers
are used to respond to higher debt. As before, the reduced steady state government
share crowds in private consumption.
If higher debt raises expected capital taxes, the long-run negative growth eﬀects
are still more pronounced. Lower expected returns to investment sharply reduce
investment, output, and consumption.8 After an initial increase, hours worked return
rapidly to their original steady state level. When capital taxes are expected to adjust
to balance the budget, a permanent cut in labor taxes produces only an ephemeral
increase in growth; in the long run, growth can fall.
Fiscal adjustments operating through government consumption or one of the two
distorting income taxes can generate permanent changes in important macroeconomic
variables. This result is an outgrowth of the permanent increase in the debt-output
ratio induced by the permanent tax cuts. A higher level of government indebtedness
carries with higher debt service, which requires permanent ﬁscal adjustments to ensure
the government is solvent.
8Similar results appear in Gordon and Leeper’s (2005) study of countercyclical ﬁscal policies.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 11
5. Debt-Output Ratio and Growth Effects of Tax Cuts
We have shown, perhaps not surprisingly, that the dynamic impacts of tax-rate
reductions hinge critically on assumptions about which ﬁscal instruments adjust to
satisfy the government’s budget constraint intertemporally. What might be surprising
is that even in a bare-bones neoclassical growth model, the speed of ﬁscal adjustment
can matter.
Figures 4 and 5 reproduce the exercises in ﬁgures 2 and 3 under a variety of settings
of the ﬁscal adjustment parameters (the q’s). Those parameters take values that imply
the adjustment ranges from gradual, as in ﬁgures 2 and 3, to aggressive. Figure 4
shows results for a permanent capital tax rate cut. In the ﬁrst column, government
consumption adjusts, with qG = −0.2 (dotted-dashed line),q G = −0.3 (dashed line),
and qG = −0.9 (solid line). Column two varies the response of transfers to debt, with
qT = −0.3 (dotted-dashed),q T = −0.5 (dashed), and qT = −1.5 (solid). In the last
column, the labor tax rate adjusts with settings of qL =0 .15 (dotted-dashed),q L =0 .3
(dashed), and qL =0 .8 (solid). Figure 5 reports responses to a permanent labor tax
rate cut. Columns one and two are generated under the same ﬁscal adjustment
parameters as in ﬁgure 4; in the third column, the capital tax rate adjusts at speeds
given by qK =0 .2 (dotted-dashed),q K =0 .6 (dashed), and qK =2(solid). The choice
of settings for the q’s is somewhat arbitrary; they roughly cover the range of q’s that
yield a unique equilibrium. Diﬀerent q values yield diﬀerent quantitative results, but
the qualitative patterns are covered by the values considered.
Several observations emerge from these ﬁgures. First, the aggressiveness of ﬁscal
policy’s response to debt matters a great deal for long-run growth eﬀects (except,
of course, when the transfer share adjusts). Second, the stronger the response to
debt, the smaller the debt-output ratio in the new steady state, and the stronger the
long-run growth eﬀects of a tax cut (except when transfers adjust). For example,
in response to a labor tax rate cut, when the government consumption ratio is the
oﬀsetting policy, the growth eﬀects remain positive in the new steady state when
qG = −0.9.W i t h qG = −0.3, in contrast, the tax cut has essentially no growth
eﬀects, while qG = −0.2 produces negative growth (column 1 of ﬁgure 5). In the
case when capital taxes adjust to a labor tax rate cut, although long-run growth is
negative under the three qK’s examined, the larger the qK, the smaller the reduction
in growth.
These ﬁgures put a sharp point on an earlier observation. The more rapidly policy
adjusts to a tax cut, the less debt accumulates, and the lower is the required debt
service. The level of debt service in the new steady state is an important determinant
of long-run growth when debt must be serviced by a distorting ﬁscal instrument.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 12
The systematic relationship between the speed of ﬁscal adjustment to debt and
long-run growth outcomes has important policy implications. Not only does tax policy
inﬂuence long-run growth, but debt management policy also matters. A relatively
small response in the short run when the budget starts deteriorating can be more
costly in terms of growth in the long run.
6. Revenue Effects of Tax Cuts
A major concern of ﬁscal authorities is how the growth eﬀects of tax policies aﬀect
the revenue estimates of tax proposals. A tax proposal estimated to have smaller
revenue loss is more likely to be adopted than one with bigger losses. Under the
presumption that tax cuts generate growth, revenue estimation by either static scoring
or the methods conventionally used by government agencies overlooks the growth
eﬀects of tax cuts, and hence overstates their associated revenue losses.
Mankiw and Weinzierl’s (forthcoming) calculation in a model without debt supports
this claim. Under their benchmark parameter values, they ﬁnd that growth pays for
53 percent of the static revenue loss in the new steady state for a capital tax rate
cut, and 17 percent for a labor tax cut. Also, the revenue loss for either tax cut is
smaller than the static revenue loss in each period along the transition path. This
result is expected, as tax cuts ﬁnanced by reducing lump-sum transfers generate
higher output both on the transition path and in the new steady state. Table 3
calculates the percentage of static revenue eﬀects oﬀset by higher growth at various
points in time using the setup where lump-sum transfers adjust to clear the budget.
Tax revenue is deﬁned as the sum of capital and labor taxes and does not include
lump-sum taxes. Static revenue eﬀects are computed holding the tax base at its
original steady state path (as if the tax cuts have no impact on tax bases). Under our
benchmark parameter values, 95.2 percent and 47.2 percent of static revenue losses
are oﬀset by higher growth in the new steady state. As Mankiw and Weinzierl ﬁnd,
static scoring always overstates the revenue loss for tax cuts ﬁnanced by lump-sum
taxes or transfers.
Because the large revenue responses are driven by positive output reactions through-
out the transition path, it is not diﬃcult to see that if output turns negative, as it
does when government consumption or capital taxes adjust to a permanent cut in the
labor tax rate, static scoring can understate or overstate revenue losses. For example,
when the future government consumption ratio is reduced in response to rising debt,
under the benchmark parameter values, static scoring understates the revenue loss of
a labor tax rate cut in the new steady state. Table 4 reports percentages of static
revenue losses oﬀset by higher growth when tax cuts are ﬁnanced by reductions inDYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 13
the government consumption ratio. For a capital tax rate cut, 34.9 percent of static
r e v e n u el o s si so ﬀset by higher growth in the new steady state. In the case of a labor
tax rate cut, the revenue loss under dynamic scoring is 13 percent above the loss
under static scoring in the new steady state. In other words, the conclusion that
static revenue estimates always overstate the revenue loss of a tax cut, as Mankiw
and Weinzierl (forthcoming) argue, may not hold when taxes are ﬁnanced by schemes
other than lump-sum transfers.
Diﬀerences between the dynamic scores we report in table 3 and Mankiw and
Weinzierl’s results stem from diﬀerences in model calibrations. The diﬀerences can be
reconciled by changing three aspects of our calibration: reduce the steady state capital
tax rate from .35 to .25; increase the steady state percentage of time spent working
from 20 percent to 34 percent; reduce the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
leisure from 1 to .5. Under the alternative calibration, the degree to which permanent
tax reductions are self-ﬁnancing is much closer to Mankiw and Weinzierl’s numbers:
66.8 percent for capital taxes and 25.3 percent for labor taxes in the new steady state.
We do not wish to argue that one set of numbers is more plausible than another.
Our point is that the numbers are sensitive both to model calibration, as Mankiw
and Weinzierl acknowledge, and to assumptions about how future policy responds to
debt-ﬁnanced tax cuts.
7. Concluding Remarks
Mankiw and Weinzierl (forthcoming) provide a provocative answer to the pressing
policy issue of whether conventional theory is consistent with the popular view that
tax cuts can be self-ﬁnancing. Their optimistic conclusion is that, although not
fully self-ﬁnancing, permanent reductions in capital and labor taxes can stimulate
economic growth and expand the tax base enough to oﬀset sizeable fractions of the
revenue losses. The thought experiment underlying this sanguine conclusion involves
replacing a distorting tax with a non-distorting tax.
To be sure, Mankiw and Weinzierl have isolated one mechanism at work following
tax changes. But implementing their thought experiment may be diﬃcult in practice,
as it entails reducing politically sensitive transfer programs to balance the govern-
ment’s budget intertemporally. In practice, reduction in one source of distortion may
be associated with change in some other distortion. This paper has examined two
other distortions–government consumption and an alternative tax rate–to ﬁnd that
Mankiw and Weinzierl’s conclusions about the growth eﬀects of tax reductions hinge
on the particular thought experiment they conduct. Very diﬀerent results emerge
when other distortions adjust.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 14
The paper has also shown that how aggressively policies adjust to increases in gov-
ernment debt can matter for the long-run growth eﬀects of tax reductions. Postponing
adjustment or very gradual adjustment can take the economy to a new steady state
with higher debt. When that debt is serviced with a distorting ﬁscal instrument, the
beneﬁcial growth eﬀects of tax reductions can be partially or completely reversed.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 15
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qT <0 0 0 0
qG 0 <0 0 0
qK 0 0 >0 0
qL 0 0 0 >0
Table 1. Parameter settings under various policy rules.
parameter value parameter value parameter value parameter value
α 0.36 δ 0.1 sT 0.07 qK 0.3
β 0.96 h 1.02 τK 0.35 qL 0.2
γ 1 χ 3 τL 0.25 qT -0.4
θ 1 sG 0.2 qG -0.2 ρK,ρ L 1
Table 2. Benchmark parameters settings.
years after a tax cut capital tax rate cut labor tax rate cut






new steady state 95.2 47.2
Table 3. Percent of static revenue impact oﬀset by higher growth
when tax cuts ﬁnanced by lump-sum transfer-output ratio reductions.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 18
years after a tax cut capital tax rate cut labor tax rate cut







new steady state 34.9 -13.0
Table 4. Percent of static revenue impact oﬀset by higher growth
when tax cuts ﬁnanced by government consumption-output ratio re-
ductions.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 19

































Figure 1. Impulse responses to a permanent 1% capital or labor tax
rate reduction when lump-sum taxes adjust to balance the budget (in
perecent). The surprise tax cut occurs at period 0. Responses plotted
over 100-year horizon when economy has approximately reached new
steady state path.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 20





































Figure 2. Alternative Financing Schemes. Responses to a permanent
1% capital tax rate reduction (in percent). The surprise tax cut occurs
at period 0. Responses plotted over 100-year horizon when economy
has approximately reached new steady state path. Government con-
sumption adjusts in dotted-dashed line; labor tax rates adjust in solid
line; lump-sum transfers adjust in dashed line.DYNAMIC SCORING: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING SCHEMES 21
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Figure 3. Alternative Financing Schemes. Responses to a permanent
1% labor tax rate reduction. The surprise tax cut occurs at period
0. Responses plotted over 100-year horizon when economy has ap-
proximately reached new steady state path. Government consumption
adjusts in dotted-dashed line; capital tax rates adjust in solid line;





























































Figure 4. Various Fiscal Adjustments to a Permanent 1% Capital
Tax Rate Reduction. The surprise tax cut occurs at period 0. Re-
sponses plotted over 100-year horizon when economy has approximately
reached new steady state path (in percent). First column–government
consumption adjusts: dotted-dashed (qG = −.2), dashed (qG = −.3),
solid (qG = −.9). Second column–transfers adjust: dotted-dashed
(qT = −.3), dashed (qT = −.5), solid (qT = −1.5). Third column–
labor taxes adjust: dotted-dashed (qL = .15), dashed (qL = .3), solid

























































Figure 5. Various Fiscal Adjustments to a Permanent 1% Labor Tax
Rate Reduction. The surprise tax cut occurs at period 0. Responses
plotted over 100-year horizon when economy has approximately reached
new steady state path (in percent). First column–government con-
sumption adjusts: dotted-dashed (qG = −.2), dashed (qG = −.3),
solid (qG = −.9). Second column–transfers adjust: dotted-dashed
(qT = −.3), dashed (qT = −.5), solid (qT = −1.5). Third column–
labor taxes adjust: dotted-dashed (qK = .2), dashed (qK = .6), solid
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